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The feeling is widespread that the financial strength of  U.S. corporations 
has eroded over the past 20 years.' The apparent increase in debt financ- 
ing, especially short-term and floating rate debt, has alarmed many ob- 
servers. Declining liquidity ratios and heavy reliance on external funds 
have also caused concern.  These trends typically are blamed on some 
combination of three factors: the tax system, which is said to favor debt 
over equity financing: inflation, which causes internal funds to lag behind 
total needs and is alleged to make debt cheap; and overly optimistic as- 
sessments of business risk. 
This paper examines corporate financing developments of the past two 
decades from a long-run perspective. Recent years' trends are compared 
with those for the twentieth century as a whole in an attempt to shed some 
light on the following questions: Is it true that corporations have increas- 
ingly relied on external funds of all kinds, especially debt? Are the trends 
of recent years unusual in light of prior years? What causes long-run pat- 
terns in corporate finance? Have U.S.  corporations indeed become finan- 
cially weak? 
Section 1.1 of the paper uses a variety of data sources to determine what 
financing trends have actually occurred over the twentieth century. Spe- 
cial emphasis is placed on the problem of accurate measurement during 
Robert A. Taggart, Jr., is professor of finance at Boston University and a research associ- 
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1. This feeling is especially prevalent among members of  the business press (see Business 
Week  1974, 1982; Carson-Parker  1981; Bennett 1984) and analysts of the financial system 
(see Massaro  1977; Mains  1980; Kaufman  1981; Moran  1984). Government officials have 
also expressed concern over corporate financing trends, particularly in the wake of the lever- 
aged buyout boom (e.g., Shad 1984). 
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inflationary periods. Section 1.2 examines the ability of taxes, inflation, 
and perceived business risk to explain these financing trends. The impact 
of federal government borrowing on the financing decisions of the busi- 
ness sector is also considered. Section 1.3 summarizes the paper’s findings 
and attempts to identify the key determinants of future developments in 
corporate financing. 
1.1  Corporate Financing Trends, 1900-1983 
1.1.1  Debt Ratios 
Perhaps the most commonly used  measure of financial condition is 
some form of  debt ratio, computed with ordinary accounting data. For 
the U.S. corporate sector as a whole, such data are available from the In- 
ternal Revenue Service Statistics of Income for the years  1926-81,  and 
from these data the ratio of  long-term  debt to total  capitalization  is 
graphed in figure 1.1. It is easy to see from this figure why there is a wide- 
spread feeling not only that corporate debt usage has increased steadily in 
the years since World War I1 but that it has reached historical peaks in re- 
cent years.* Perhaps less widely appreciated is the apparent fact that the 
rise in debt ratios ceased in the early 1970s. One might conclude from fig- 
ure 1.1 that U.S. corporations were increasingly willing to take on finan- 
cial risk in the postwar years but that debt ratios have remained stable at a 
new higher plateau for roughly the past decade. 
However, the accounting data on which figure 1.1 is based are subject 
to several potential biases and should be interpreted with caution. Liberal- 
ization of depreciation allowances, as has occurred at several points from 
the  1960s onward, increases corporate cash flow but reduces measured 
profits and retained earnings. Thus debt ratios will tend to be overstated 
when allowed depreciation is increased. Inflation also causes distortions 
in accounting data. Reported asset values may be understated in an infla- 
tion, resulting in overstated debt ratios.  Likewise, standard accounting 
data do not reflect decreases in the real value of  debt, and reported debt 
ratios may thus exaggerate the real burden of corporate liabilities. On the 
other hand, accounting data have not  traditionally  included such off- 
balance-sheet items as lease obligations and unfunded pension liabilities, 
so reported debt ratios may also contain some understatements. 
2. Perceived trends, of course, are always dependent on  the observer’s reference point. 
Miller (1963) examined the same data from  1926 through the mid-1950s and concluded, 
quite reasonably, that there had been no  trend in corporate debt ratios over this period. 
3. Gordon and Malkiel(l981) present evidence for the period 1973-78 suggesting that in- 
clusion of lease and pension obligations would increase reported debt ratios by approximately 
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Fig. 1.1  Ratio of  long-term debt to total capitalization, all United 
States corporations 
Figure 1.2 tracks the movement of two alternative debt ratio calcula- 
tions that attempt to correct for some of the biases in standard accounting 
data. The first of these is an estimated ratio of the market value of debt to 
the market  value of total capitalization of  U.S.  nonfinancial corpora- 
tions.  The underlying data are taken from Holland and Myers (1979). 
who estimated market values for debt and equity by capitalizing total cor- 
porate interest and dividend payments at current market yields. The mar- 
ket value ratio should adjust for inflation-induced valuation changes and 
thus provide a more accurate measure of  the burden of corporate debt. 
The primary disadvantages of this measure are that it is subject to estima- 
tion error, and it does not allow separation of actual corporate financing 
decisions from changes in market valuation. 
As shown in figure 1.2, the market value debt ratio is more volatile than 
the book value ratio. It does, however, exhibit somewhat the same general 
pattern. Corporate debt ratios were relatively high in the 1930s and early 
1940s, but they declined markedly by the end of World War 11. There then 
appears to have been an upward trend in the postwar period, although the 
market value data suggest that much of the upward movement took place 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Finally, this rise in the debt ratio leveled 
off in the mid-l970s, with declines occurring in the most recent years. 
The second ratio graphed in figure 1.2 is an estimated ratio of the mar- 
ket value of  debt to the replacement value of  assets for U.S.  nonfinancial 16  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
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Fig. 1.2  Market value and replacement value debt ratios, United States 
nonfinancial corporations 
corporations. Like the market value data, the replacement value estimates 
are aimed at eliminating inflationary distortions. Another advantage of 
this measure is that by combining the estimates of Goldsmith et al. (1963) 
for the early years with more recent estimates by von Furstenberg (1977), 
it is possible to  put together a long series of comparable ratios. 
Again, the replacement value ratios exhibit a broad pattern that is simi- 
lar in many respects to  that of the book value ratios: corporate  debt usage 
apparently fell to  a low point at the end of World War I1  and subsequently 
rose. However, the replacement value data suggest that the steadiest in- 
creases were over by the mid-l960s, with a more cyclical pattern ensuing 
since then. An especially interesting feature of the replacement value data 
is their implication that corporate debt usage was quite high early in the 
century. By these estimates, the corporate debt ratio was unusually low at 
the end of World War 11, and it has only recently attained the levels that 
were normal in the period 1900- 1930. 
Considered as a group, all three debt ratio measures suggest that the 
end of World War  I1 may be a quite misleading reference  point  from 
which to  judge recent corporate  financing trends. It seems undeniable that 
corporate debt usage has risen in the postwar period, but it is far from 
clear that current debt levels are unusually high when viewed from a long- 
run perspective. 17  Have US.  Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
1  .I  .2  Liquidity Ratios 
Liquidity ratios are a second type of balance sheet ratio frequently used 
to measure financial condition. The ratios of liquid assets to total assets 
and to  short-term liabilities for U.S. nonfinancial corporations are shown 
in table 1.1 for selected years. Total assets are measured at replacement 
value, while short-term liabilities are measured at book value. 
As  worried observers have noted, there indeed appears to have been a 
substantial decline in corporate liquidity during the postwar period. How- 
ever, as with the debt ratios,  1945 was a year of unusually low financial 
risk for corporations. Not only were their debt ratios at historic lows by 
the end of the war, but they held large amounts of U.S.  government secu- 
rities as well. If we subtracted liquid asset holdings from total debt, we 
would see that corporations were effectively in a position of  negative lev- 
erage at that time. 
From a longer-run perspective, recent ratios of liquid assets to total as- 
sets do not seem alarmingly low. Their levels are roughly commensurate 
with those of the 1900-1930 period. It does appear, though, that the most 
recent ratio of  liquid assets to  short-term liabilities is somewhat low, even 
by historical  standards. This suggests that short-term debt has risen  in 
relative terms at the same time that liquid assets have been  declining. 
Whether or not this trend is cause for concern will be considered further 
below. 
Table 1.1  Liquid Asset Ratios, U.S. NonEnancinl Corporations 
Liquid Assets*  Liquid Assetst 
Year  Total Assets  Short-Term Liabilities 
1900  ,061  .299 
1912  .066  .322 
1922  ,070  .300 
1929  ,067  .311 
1933  ,060  .297 
1939  .076  ,452 
1945  .167  .822 
1953  .121  ,597 
1964  ,086  .373 
1975  ,056  ,301 
1982  N.A.  .248 
*Liquid assets consist of currency, deposits, and marketable securities other than corporate 
stock. Total assets are measured at replacement  value.  Data for  1900-1945  are from 
Goldsmith et al. (1963) and for 1953-75  from Goldsmith (1982). 
?Short-term liabilities are loans (except mortgages), short-term paper, profit taxes payable, 
and trade debt. Data for 1900-1945  are from Goldsmith et al. (1963) and for 1953-82 
from Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts. 18  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
1.1.3  Flows of Funds 
A different approach to assessing corporations’ financial condition is 
to examine flows of funds over selected periods. While the balance sheet 
measures the cumulative effect of all prior flows as of  a particular mo- 
ment, the flow data reflect corporations’ actual financing decisions dur- 
ing specified periods. In figure 1.3, for example, the yearly flows of gross 
internal  funds (retained earnings plus  depreciation allowances), total 
debt, and new equity issues, expressed as fractions of total yearly sources 
of  funds for U.S. nonfinancial corporations, are graphed for the period 
FRACTION OF 
TOTAL SOURCES 
-  ,101 
Fig. 1.3  Composition of funds sources, United States nonfinancial 
corporations 19  Have U.S. Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
1946-83. Data are taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Ac- 
counts. 
These data do give one indication of financial duress for the corporate 
sector in recent years that was not readily apparent in the balance sheet 
data: the volatility of funds flow composition has increased tremendously 
since the early 1970s. The availability of internal funds relative to total fi- 
nancing needs has alternately plunged and soared. Simultaneously, debt 
usage has reached unusually high levels when internal funds were short 
and unusually low levels when internal funds were plentiful. Once again it 
should be noted, though, that one’s reference point is important to any 
conclusions about volatility. It could possibly be argued that the period 
from the late 1950s to the late 1960s was one of unusual stability and that 
recent fluctuations are more akin to those experienced in the immediate 
postwar years. 
An accurate picture of long-term trends is more likely to emerge if  we 
smooth out some of these yearly fluctuations. The same funds flow ratios 
are thus shown for 5-year periods in table 1.2. The use of longer periods 
also allows the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data to be supplemented by 
lhble 1.2  Composition of Financing Flows, U.S. Non6nandPl Corporalions 
Fractions of Total Sources of Funds+ 
Total 
Long-  Short-  S hort-Term  Gross 
Total  Term  Term  Credit Market  New Stock  Internal 
Debt  Debtt  Liabilities  DebtS  Issues  Funds 
Period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1901-12  .31  .23  .08  .14  .55 
1913-22  .29  .I2  .17  .ll  .60 
1923-29  .26  .22  .04  .19  .55 
1930-39  -  .33  -  .05  -  .29  .19  1.14 
1940-45  .I5  -.05  .20  .05  .80 
1946-48  .40  .18  .22  .09  .04  .56 
1949-53  .30  .14  .16  .04  .06  .64 
1954-58  .28  .I5  .13  .05  .05  .68 
1959-63  .30  .14  .16  .06  .02  .68 
1964-68  .37  .I5  .22  .10  .01  .62 
1969-73  .45  .19  .26  .ll  .06  30 
1974-78  .38  .13  .25  .12  .02  .60 
1979-83  .35  .09  .26  .14  .02  .63 
+Columns  may not add to totals because of rounding. 
?Long-term debt is defined as bonds and mortgages. All bank loans are included as short- 
term debt even though some fraction of these have maturities longer than one year. 
$Includes bank loans, commercial paper, acceptances, finance company loans and U.S. 
government loans. 
Sources: Goldsmith (1958) and Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, Flow 
of Funds Accounts. 20  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
Goldsmith’s (1958) estimates of funds flow composition for selected peri- 
ods between 1900 and 1945. 
Several trends are apparent in table 1.2. First, debt has accounted for a 
consistently larger fraction of total financing since the mid-1960s than was 
the case for nearly all prior periods. Even with recent declines from the 
1969-73 peak, debt financing appears to be quite high. Second, the rise in 
debt financing has not been  caused by an increase in long-term debt, 
which, if anything, may exhibit some downtrend. Rather, it is short-term 
liabilities that have increased markedly. Third, the increase in short-term 
debt cannot be predominantly attributed to the growth of such spontane- 
ous liabilities as tax accruals and trade debt. Much of it has come from 
credit market instruments, such as bank loans and commercial paper.4 
Fourth, stock issues fell precipitously as a source of funds during World 
War I1 and have remained low ever since. Finally, it is difficult to discern 
any long-run trend in internal funds. 
At least in part, then, any trend toward increased debt-equity ratios 
could be characterized as a substitution of short-term debt for external eq- 
uity. Such a characterization offers some support for the fears of those ob- 
servers who argue that U.S. corporations have dramatically increased 
their exposure to financial risk. 
However, this interpretation of the data is subject to qualification. As it 
does with the balance sheet ratios, inflation may distort the financing pic- 
ture reflected in the Flow of Funds data. In particular, von Furstenberg 
and Malkiel(l977) have argued that annual funds flows should be adjusted 
for any changes in firms’ real indebtedness during the year that are caused 
by changes in the price level. 
Suppose, for example, that the real interest rate is 4%. If expected in- 
flation suddenly increases from zero to  8070, lenders will demand a nomi- 
nal interest rate of  roughly 12% in order to provide themselves a 4% real 
return. If the inflationary process is neutral, one would expect these nomi- 
nal adjustments to take place, leaving the real pattern of corporate prof- 
its, investment, and financing undisturbed. 
Note, however, that in this example a neutral inflation will increase cor- 
porations’ operating cash flows by 8070, while their nominal interest pay- 
ments rise by 200%. As conventionally reported, corporate internal funds 
will not rise as fast as the inflation rate. If the flow of debt financing re- 
mains constant in real terms, this necessarily implies that nominal debt fi- 
nancing will rise relative to  nominal internal funds. 
4. Some portion of bank loans should in fact be classified as longterm, but the actual frac- 
tion is impossible to estimate with any degree of confidence. There is no evidence of  any 
trend toward increasingly long-term bank loans from, say, the mid-1960s onward. More- 
over, the predominance of  floating rate loans in recent years implies that even bank term 
loans have many of the characteristics of short-term debt. 21  Have U.S.  Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
The inflation premium in nominal interest payments is more appropri- 
ately treated as a return of the lender's real principal, which just compen- 
sates for the decline in real value of the nominal principal. As a return of 
principal, however, this amount should not be deducted from corporate 
profits but rather treated as any other net retirement of debt. By this argu- 
ment, we should therefore add to reported internal funds any decline in 
the real value of outstanding debt, since it is not in the true sense a current 
expense. The same amount should also be subtracted from reported debt 
issues. Since it represents a retirement of  real principal, only new debt is- 
sues over and above this amount represent net increases in real debt. 
The data in table 1.2 were therefore adjusted for changes in real indebt- 
edness, following the procedure outlined in von Furstenberg and Malkiel 
(1977). The revised relative proportions of gross internal funds and total 
debt are shown in table 1.3, alongside the corresponding unadjusted fig- 
ures. 
'hble 1.3  Cornpodon of  Corporate Finnndng Flows  Adjusted for Changes 
in Red Indebtedness 
Fractions of Total Sources 
Gross Internal 
Funds  Total Debt 
Unadjusted*  Adjustedt  Unadjusted  Adjusted 


































































*Unadjusted financing flow data are from Goldsmith (1958) and Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Flow of  Funds Accounts. 
?Data are adjusted by  subtracting the change in real indebtedness for the period from 
gross internal funds and adding the same change to total debt. Changes in price level 
are measured by the implicit GNP deflator for 1901-48  (source: Historical Statistics of 
the United States) and by the index of total cost and profit for nonfinancial corporations 
for 1949-83  (source: Economic Report ofrhe President). Data on total liabilities  outstandmg 
at the beginning of each period are from Goldsmith et al. (1963) and Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts. 22  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
The adjusted figures give the impression that recent debt proportions 
are by no means unusually high. Even after adjusting for inflation, how- 
ever, the proportions of  debt financing in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were unusually high, and the past 8 years have witnessed a substantial cor- 
rection. Much of this correction has occurred through heavy reliance on 
adjusted internal sources. Instead of financing funds needs with increas- 
ing or even constant proportions of real debt, corporations have in effect 
been retiring  some of  their  maturing real debt principal  with internal 
funds. 
1.1.4  Dividend Payout Ratios 
The assertion that corporations have placed heavy emphasis on internal 
funds in recent years naturally raises the question whether they have sacri- 
ficed dividend payments in order to do so. Three measures of corporate 
dividend payout over selected periods are presented in table 1.4. 
The ratios in columns 1 and 2 measure dividend payments relative to to- 
tal available internal funds. Both the adjusted and unadjusted internal 
funds measures from table 1.3 have been used in computing these ratios. 
The data suggest that corporations did indeed cut their dividend payout 
somewhat, even before the peak in debt issuance,in an attempt to  increase 
the share of equity financing. 
Table 1.4  Dividend Payout Ratios 
Dividends  Dividends 
Dividends Plus Gross Internal 
Funds 
U.S. Nonfinancial Corporations 
Unadjusted  Adjusted  All U.S.  Corporations 
Net Profit after Tax 









1959 -  63 
1964-68 
1969-73 
1974 -  78 




























Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, 
and U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics  of Income 23  Have U.S.  Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
The more traditional measure of  payout, dividends divided by net profit 
after taxes, is shown in column 3. These figures also convey the impres- 
sion that dividends were cut fairly severely in order to conserve internal 
funds, beginning as early as the mid-1960s. Some of the decline in payout 
in the mid-1960s may be attributable to the well-known tendency of divi- 
dends to lag behind profits. However, subsequent periods were not par- 
ticularly profitable ones for U.S. corporations, so this does not explain 
away the long period of relatively low payouts from 1964 to the present. 
The decline in payout during the 1974-78 period is particularly dramatic. 
1.1.5  Summary of  Financing Trends 
Does the weight of the evidence support the view that U.S.  corporations 
have become increasingly prone to  financial weakness? In most respects, I 
believe the most plausible answer is no. Many assertions of corporate bal- 
ance sheet deterioration use the end of  World War I1 as their reference 
point, but as we have seen, that was hardly a typical time. Viewed from a 
longer-run perspective, current corporate  debt usage does not appear dan- 
gerously high nor does liquidity appear dangerously low.’ In addition, ad- 
justment for inflationary distortions over the past 15 years removes some 
of the trend toward increased debt that appears in the raw data. Finally, it 
should be recognized that corporations have made substantial efforts over 
the past 8 years, particularly through reduced dividend payout, to rebuild 
financial strength. 
Nevertheless, some opposing points must be conceded. The financial 
environment of the past 10-15 years has been more volatile, as is reflected 
in the sharp changes in the composition of funds sources. Corporate  trea- 
surers have had to act more nimbly and imaginatively in order to keep up 
with the fluctuations in external funds needs. Increased use of short-term 
and floating rate debt has undeniably made corporations more vulnerable 
to interest rate fluctuations. And even if  some of corporate borrowing in 
recent years is a rolling over of real principal instead of net new debt, it is 
still true that these rollovers necessitate more frequent visits to the capital 
market. 
1.2  What Causes the Trends in Corporate Financing? 
Regardless  of  our perception  of financial  strength  or weakness,  we 
could feel more comfortable with our understanding of these corporate  fi- 
nancing developments if we knew their primary determinants. This in turn 
necessitates a theory of corporate capital structure. 
5.  See also Mitchell (1983) for an elaboration of the argument that, even if liquidity ratios 
have declined, the growth of bank loan commitments and the commercial paper market have 
increased corporations’ ability to raise funds on short notice. 24  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
It is widely believed that corporations adjust their financing to some 
target balance sheet composition. As Myers (1984) has argued, the adjust- 
ment process may be quite slow, and thus there may be a good deal of slip- 
page between actual and target balance sheets. For example, subject to 
their established dividend policies, firms may have a decided preference 
for internal over external funds and, to the extent that external funds are 
needed, for debt over stock issues. Thus when internal funds are plentiful 
relative to investment needs, debt ratios will fall below target, while the re- 
verse will occur when internal funds are in short supply. 
Despite this slippage, the influence of  the target financing composition 
will be felt over the long run. Corporations do  reach points where they feel 
their debt capacity is  exhausted and they must turn to external equity. 
Moreover, the standards for debt capacity and the willingness to  issue eq- 
uity appear to  change over time. From table 1.2, the reluctance to issue eq- 
uity was apparently much less in the 1900-1940 period than it has been in 
recent decades. 
The primary determinants of these changing standards that have been 
emphasized by business financing observers are perceptions of business 
risk, the level of corporate and personal taxes, and inflation. In the para- 
graphs that follow I will explore the extent to which changes in these un- 
derlying factors correspond to business financing patterns. The possible 
influence of  federal government borrowing on business financing will also 
be considered. 
1.2.1  Business Risk 
Since the threat of bankruptcy entails both explicit and implicit costs, 
firms will limit their debt ratios in order to  avoid it. For any given debt level, 
the threat of bankruptcy is greater as the degree of business risk increases. 
Thus we would expect an inverse relationship between corporate debt ra- 
tios and perceived business risk. 
Unfortunately, perceived business risk is notoriously difficult to mea- 
sure. A possible proxy for investors’ risk perceptions in a given year is the 
standard deviation of monthly percentage stock price changes for that 
year. Estimates of  these standard deviations, derived from Standard and 
Poor’s Composite Index for the years 1900-1980,  are shown in figure 1.4, 
plotted against the pattern of replacement value debt ratios. 
Movements in stock price volatility are dominated by the tremendous 
fluctuations of  the Depression era. Figure 1.4 thus offers some support 
for the argument made by many observers: Corporate  debt ratios plunged 
in the wake of the huge increases in business risk during the Great Depres- 
sion and then began a long and steady climb, as business risk consistently 
remained at lower levels in the postwar years. 
However, the ability of  this proxy  for business  risk  to explain the 
shorter swings in corporate debt ratios is not very great. One might argue 25  Have U.S. Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
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Corporate debt ratios and perceived business risk  Fig. 1.4 
that the increased volatility around 1980 is associated with the reductions 
in debt financing that are apparent in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
data in tables 1.2 and 1  .3.6  But the sharp changes in the debt ratio between 
1900 and 1922 do not correspond to changes in volatility, and it is similarly 
difficult to match up most financing swings since 1960 with stock price 
fluctuations. Overall, the evidence that perceived  business risk continually 
and consistently affects corporate financing patterns is limited. 
1.2.2  Corporate and Personal Taxes 
It is commonly held that the tax deductibility of interest favors debt 
over equity financing. From an investor’s standpoint, however, interest is 
taxable at ordinary income rates, whereas a substantial fraction of the re- 
turns to equity are taxed at lower capital gains rates. The degree to which 
the tax advantage of debt at the corporate level outweighs its disadvantage 
6. Other measures indicate an increase in business risk around this time as well. Wood 
(1981), for example, shows that the volatility of  real interest rates increased sharply after 
1972. Bodie et al. (1984) show that  the real  risk premium on long-term bonds suddenly 
jumped in 1979. 26  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
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Fig.  1.5  Corporate debt ratios and income tax rates 
at the investor level thus depends on  the relative magnitudes of corporate 
and personal tax rates. 
There is, of course, a whole spectrum of personal tax rates, and what is 
really needed is some idea of the distribution of investor wealth across tax 
brackets.  In the absence of  such information, a cruder measure, which I 
label the “debt incentive tax ratio,” has been constructed as a proxy for 
the net tax advantage of corporate debt. It is essentially a comparison be- 
tween statutory corporate tax rates and the lowest level of statutory per- 
sonal rates.’  This debt incentive tax ratio has been graphed in figure 1.5 
against the replacement value debt ratio. 
Figure 1.5 indicates that the biggest increase in the net tax advantage to 
corporate debt occurred between the late 1930s and early 1950s. The fact 
that this tax advantage has remained at a relatively high level for the past 
40  years is undoubtedly related to  the postwar increases in corporate debt. 
This tax advantage has been nearly constant for some time, though, so it 
cannot explain short-run fluctuations in the debt-equity  mix.  It is also 
something of a puzzle that debt financing proportions were high early in 
the century when there was no tax advantage and then fell after the tax 
code was introduced. 
While there is little evidence of a close correspondence between move- 
ments in tax rates and corporate debt ratios, it is possible that some of the 
7. Specifically, the debt incentive-tax ratio is (tc - rp)/(l - tp), where tc is the corporate 
tax rate and tp is the lowest personal rate. In Miller’s (1977) model this measures the net tax 
advantage per dollar of corporate debt when investors have tax rate tp. 27  Have U.S. Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
effect of tax considerations has been felt in more subtle ways. One could 
argue on the basis of table 1.4 that corporations have cut their dividend 
payouts somewhat in the wake of personal tax increases occurring in the 
1940s and have thus substituted internal for external equityh addition, 
tax considerations have clearly influenced the design of securities, apart 
from their relative proportions. This can be seen through such recent in- 
novations  as  original-issue discount  bonds,  adjustable rate  preferred 
stock, and the short-lived adjustable rate convertible note. 
1.2.3  Inflation 
Inflation is a third factor that is  often thought to affect corporate fi- 
nancing proportions. One argument is that inflation enables corporations 
to repay their debt with cheaper dollars, but it is hard to understand why 
investors would  not  try to protect  themselves through  higher  interest 
rates. A more sophisticated argument revolves around the fact that as it 
causes interest rates to rise, inflation increases the effective real tax deduc- 
tions associated with debt. The inflation premium in interest rates is, of 
course, also taxable to investors, but as long as the corporate tax rate ex- 
ceeds the personal rate of the marginal bondholder, inflation may cause 
the net tax advantage of corporate debt to increase. 
In figure 1.6, annual inflation rates, as measured by percentage changes 
in the GNP deflator, are graphed against replacement value debt ratios. 
Although debt ratios have been relatively high in the inflationary years of 
the 1970s, it would be difficult to argue on the basis of figure 1.6 that there 
has been a close positive relationship between the movements in inflation 
rates and debt ratios. 
Again, as with tax considerations, some of inflation’s effects may mani- 
fest themselves in more subtle ways. To see one such effect, consider the 
role of corporations in the financial system: Corporations perform an in- 
termediary role, purchasing and managing productive assets and, in ef- 
fect, repackaging these assets for investors in the form of debt and equity 
claims. Purely financial intermediaries may perform further repackaging. 
Through term landing, for example, commercial banks transform long- 
term business debt into shorter- term deposits. 
Now consider the effects of  high and variable inflation rates on inves- 
tors’ demand for securities. If investors prefer short-term, or at least vari- 
able rate, securities in such an environment, and if  commercial banks no 
longer find maturity intermediation  a viable activity, nonfinancial cor- 
porations will  have to perform  this function themselves. That is, they 
will  repackage more of  their assets in the form of short-term and float- 
ing rate debt  instruments.  Thus inflation,  and  in particular  uncertain 
inflation, may affect not  so much the debt-equity mix, but  rather the 
kinds of debt instruments corporations must issue to satisfy the needs of 
investors. 28  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
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1.2.4  Federal Government Borrowing 
Corporate financing behavior should also be influenced by the behav- 
ior of other sectors in the financial system. For example, the supply of 
federal government debt will condition investors'  willingness to absorb 
the relatively low-risk fixed claims represented by corporate debt. While 
not often cited as a determinant of the corporate financing mix, govern- 
ment borrowing may thus exert an important influence on the financing 
activities of the corporate sector as a whole.* 
Evidence in support of such a relationship is presented in figure 1.7, in 
which the ratio of federal government debt to that of all domestic nonfi- 
nancial sectors is graphed against the replacement value debt ratio for cor- 
porations. There appears to be a strong inverse relationship between the 
8. Exceptions include Friedman (1982) and Kaufrnan (1981). 29  Have U.S. Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
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Fig. 1.7  Corporate debt ratios and federal government borrowing 
two series. In the early part of the century, when government debt was 
small, corporations satisfied investors' demands for safe, fixed claims by 
issuing large proportions of their own debt. Then, as federal borrowing 
swelled during the Depression years and World War  11, corporate debt 
proportions fell drastically. 
The inverse relationship is even more striking if we recall from table 1.4 
that corporations held large proportions of government securities  in 1945. 
Not only was the amount of government debt curtailing corporate debt 
proportions, but, in effect, corporations were repackaging some portion 
of that government debt in the form of corporate equity. 
Following World War 11, the trend in the share of government debt has 
been primarily downward, while corporate debt ratios have simultaneously 
drifted upward. Moreover, many of the short-term swings in government 
debt share have been mirrored by opposite movements in corporate debt 
proportions. 30  Robert A. Taggart, 3r. 
When the evidence on determinants of corporate financing patterns is 
viewed as a whole,  the influence of the federal government stands out 
sharply. Although their short-run impacts are more difficult to discern, it 
has been argued that perceived business risk, the tax system, and inflation 
all appear to  exert a broad influence on the financing of the corporate  sec- 
tor. All three factors in turn are heavily influenced by federal government 
activities.  In  addition,  government  regulations  affect financial  institu- 
tions’ ability to diversify their portfolios, pay market interest rates, offer 
new customer services, and hence to fully perform their intermediation 
function. Indirectly, then, such regulations influence the extent to which 
corporations must perform this function themselves. Finally, as indicated 
by figure 1.7, the government’s borrowing affects corporate financing be- 
havior by altering relative supplies of securities in the capital markets and 
hence their relative price. Apart from the ebb and flow of investment op- 
portunities and internal funds, therefore, the activities of the federal gov- 
ernment may be the major underlying determinant of corporate financing 
patterns. 
1.3  Conclusion 
Overall, the analysis of this paper suggests that the financial condition 
of U.S. corporations is subject to  a number of powerful corrective mecha- 
nisms. These mechanisms are  unlikely to allow the business sector by itself 
to  be the leader of an unchecked slide toward financial disaster. 
First, there is some evidence that a rise in perceived business risk causes 
firms to moderate their reliance on debt financing. This tendency is hard 
to observe during short-run business cycle swings, but as business risk 
changes over prolonged periods it is more noticeable.  It is certainly evi- 
dent in the sharp cutback in debt proportions in the wake of the Great De- 
pression, for example. It also seems likely that some of the moderation in 
debt financing in recent years has been motivated by perceptions of in- 
creased business risk. 
Second, long-run balance sheet targets send strong danger signals when 
financing proportions get too far out of line. This is particularly apparent 
in the Flow of Funds data in tables 1.2 and 1.3, as debt financing was cur- 
tailed after reaching historically high levels during 1969-73. 
Moreover, it does not appear that these traditional balance sheet targets 
have been adjusted for inflationary distortions. The data in table 1.3 sug- 
gest that, once corrections are made for changes in real indebtedness, cor- 
porate financial policies were quite conservative in recent years. This may 
stand as testimony to the difficulty of convincing lenders that traditional 
balance sheet ratios do  not have the same meaning in inflationary periods. 
Indeed, U.S. corporations have severely curtailed dividend payments and 31  Have U.S. Corporations Grown Financially Weak? 
have placed heavy reliance on internal funds since the mid-1970s in an ef- 
fort to reduce their dependence on external suppliers of funds. 
Finally, the behavior of other sectors in the capital market, particularly 
the federal government, can act as an important check on corporate bor- 
rowing. Any one corporation is probably small enough that it need not 
worry about the effect of its own securities issues on the relative supplies 
of different types of instruments. The corporate  sector as a whole, by con- 
trast, must compete with the other sectors who are primarily issuers of 
debt. As the federal government in particular increases its borrowing, in- 
vestors’ appetite for corporate debt will be less strong and corporations 
may turn toward other financing sources, especially internal equity. 
While these forces act as checks against excessive risk taking, it should 
not be inferred that U.S. corporations face no financial problems whatso- 
ever. In the presence of inflation and volatile interest rates, corporations 
have increasingly had to take on some of the intermediation  functions 
that traditional financial institutions have no longer been able or willing 
to  perform. This has led them to rely more heavily on short-term liabilities 
and has necessitated more frequent rolling over of their outstanding debt. 
The outlook for inflation and economic stability, then, is one of the 
keys to future corporate financing patterns. These forces will determine 
whether corporations face the same sharp swings in internal funds avail- 
ability that they experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s. They will also 
influence the allocation of  financial intermediation activity between cor- 
porations and financial institutions. 
A second major problem that business corporations face is the future 
course of government financing. To the extent that potential corporate 
borrowing is crowded out by the federal government, the corporate  sector 
faces some potentially painful choices: it must cut dividends in order to  in- 
crease internal funds, it must raise external equity, or it must cut back on 
capital spending. 
In part, uncertainties about future corporate financing patterns reflect 
uncertainty  over the future course of inflation, economic stability, and 
government borrowing. It should also be clear, however, that a good part 
of any residual uncertainty stems from the fact that we still have much to 
learn about these patterns. The effects of business risk, taxes, and infla- 
tion leave traces in the data, but these forces do not appear to be the whole 
story. Moreover, their effects are more subtle and more difficult to uncover 
than has commonly been thought. 
At least two remaining issues require a better understanding.  One of 
these is the behavior of equity issues. Why, for example, were corpora- 
tions so much more willing to issue equity earlier in the century than they 
have been in the postwar years? Is this entirely a tax-related phenomenon, 
or are other forces at work? A second important issue is the precise nature 32  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
of the linkage between the borrowing activity of  the federal government 
and the financing, dividend, and investment policy of the corporate sec- 
tor. 
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